זכויות האדם באיראן: מאבק ומשבר

מסמך זה הוא מאמר סמינרי בנושא “הרפובליקה האסלאמית של איראן – דרכים לצדק ואחריות” שנכתב במסגרת קורס על גלובליזציה וארגונים. המאמר מנתח את ההיסטוריה הפוליטית והחברתית של איראן, את התנהלות המשטר האסלאמי בהקשר של זכויות אדם, ואת תפקידה של אמנסטי אינטרנשיונל וארגונים בינלאומיים אחרים במאבק למען צדק וזכויות אדם באיראן .

מבוא והיסטוריה של איראן

המאמר מתאר את הקמת המשטר התיאוקרטי באיראן לאחר המהפכה האסלאמית ב-1979, בהנהגת האייתוללה חומייני, שהחליף את שלטון השאה והנהיג את עקרון “וליאת הפקיה” – שלטון הפוסק האסלאמי. המשטר שם בראש מעיניו את שמירת קיומה של המדינה האסלאמית גם במחיר דחיית ערכים מודרניים ומערביים, תוך שימוש בחוק פוליטי המוסווה כחוק אסלאמי לדיכוי מתנגדים .

המאמר מציג סקירה היסטורית של איראן במאה ה-19 וה-20, כולל מהפכות מרכזיות כמו המהפכה החוקתית (1906-1911), התנועה הלאומית למילוי שמן (1951-1953), המהפכה האסלאמית (1979) ותנועת הרפורמה (1997-2009). בכל תקופה זו, הדגש היה על מאבק למען צדק חברתי, זכויות אזרח ושלטון חוק, לצד מאבקי כוח בין גורמים שונים – ממלכתיים, דתיים, לאומניים ושמאלניים .

המאמר מתאר את החוק באיראן כיום כ”היברידי” הכולל אלמנטים של חוק פוליטי, מסורתי ומקצועי, עם פרצות רבות המאפשרות שימוש לרעה על ידי השלטון לדיכוי מתנגדים. כמו כן, מוצג תפקיד משמרות המהפכה כאחראים על דיכוי הפגנות ושמירת יציבות המשטר .

אמנסטי אינטרנשיונל ותפקידה

המאמר מתאר את אמנסטי אינטרנשיונל כארגון בינלאומי הפועל להפיכת זכויות האדם מאידיאל למציאות, ללא יכולת אכיפה, אך באמצעות יצירת נורמות בינלאומיות, הפעלת לחץ ציבורי, ותיעוד הפרות זכויות אדם. הארגון פועל במתכונת עצמאית ומושתת על מחויבות מוסרית, מומחיות ואיסוף מידע מהימן .

המאמר מציין ביקורת כלפי ארגונים בינלאומיים, הטוענת כי הם לעיתים משמרים את סדרי הכוח הקיימים ומייצגים “כוח רך” של מדינות חזקות, וכן שהנורמות הבינלאומיות נתפסות לעיתים כניסיון לכפות ערכים מערביים על מדינות ריבוניות, במיוחד בהקשר הפוסט-קולוניאלי של איראן .

אירועי נובמבר 2019 באיראן

המאמר מתאר את גל המחאות שהחל בנובמבר 2019 בעקבות העלאת מחירי הדלק, שהוביל לדיכוי אלים של המפגינים על ידי כוחות הביטחון, כולל הפעלת אלימות קשה, מעצרים המוניים, ושימוש בהכחשת מידע באמצעות הפסקת אינטרנט כמעט מוחלטת. דו”חות של אמנסטי וארגונים נוספים תיעדו הוצאות להורג, עינויים, ועינויים פסיכולוגיים, כולל שידורי הודאות בכפייה בטלוויזיה הממלכתית .

המאמר מציג את דבריה של אגנס קלמארד, נציבת האו”ם לזכויות אדם, המדגישה את הצורך בחקירה עצמאית של ההפרות, מתן צדק למשפחות הקורבנות, וזיכרון הראוי של הנפגעים, לצד הביקורת על הנרטיב הרשמי המפיץ שקרים בנוגע לאירועים .

קמפיינים ופעילות דיגיטלית

המאמר מתאר קמפיינים של אמנסטי והפצת מידע ברשתות החברתיות, שמטרתם להעניק קול לאסירי מצפון באיראן ולייצר לחץ בינלאומי לשחרורם. הקמפיינים כוללים קריאת הקהל להקלטת קריאת מכתבים ושירים של האסירים, שיתוף תמונות והפצת ההודעות באמצעות האשטגים .

המאמר מדגיש את הכוח והאתגרים של המדיה החברתית ככלי להפצת מידע, אך גם מציין את התופעה של הפצת דיסאינפורמציה, “חדשות מזויפות” ומניפולציות ברשת, המחלישות את אמון הציבור בעובדות ומקשות על תהליך קבלת ההחלטות .

דיון ביקורתי ותובנות תאורטיות

המאמר דן במתחים שבין הנורמות הבינלאומיות של זכויות אדם לבין נורמות מקומיות ופרטיקולריות, ומציג את הקושי להשיג קונצנזוס בין שמירת ריבונות לאומית לבין דרישות לאוניברסליות לצדק וזכויות אדם. כמו כן, מוצגות ביקורות על תפיסות תרבותיות רלטיביסטיות ועל הטיות אוריינטליסטיות הפוגעות בהכרה בסבל האנושי באיראן .

המאמר מציין את חשיבות ההזדהות והאמפתיה כמניעים לפעולה אלטרואיסטית של פעילים בינלאומיים, ואת תפקידם של “יזמי נורמות” הפועלים דרך ארגונים בינלאומיים ומדיה חברתית לקידום ערכים אלה .

מסקנות והמלצות מעשיות

המאמר מסכם כי זכויות אדם ודמוקרטיה הן חלק מהותי מההיסטוריה והתרבות האיראנית, וכי המאבק למען צדק וזכויות הוא דינמי ומתמשך. החוק באיראן משמש לעיתים ככלי פוליטי לדיכוי, והפעילות הבינלאומית צריכה להמשיך להעניק קול לקורבנות ולפעילים, תוך מודעות למגבלות הכלים הקיימים ולמורכבות הפוליטית .

המאמר מדגיש כי שינוי במדיניות האיראנית לא יושג בכפייה אלא באמצעות שכנוע, ומעלה ספקות לגבי יעילות הסנקציות הכלכליות שננקטו. למרות זאת, יש להמשיך לתמוך בזכויות האדם באמצעות תיעוד, הפצת מידע, ופעילות ציבורית גלובלית .

The Hebrew University ¹Department of Sociology and Anthropology ²

Seminar Paper in the Course: ³Globalization and Organizations ⁴

Topic: ⁵The Islamic Republic of Iran – Paths to Justice and Accountability ⁶

Submitted by: Eliphelet Lavi ⁷ID: 038778817 ⁸Lecturer: Gili Drori ⁹Date ¹⁰

Table of Contents ¹¹

Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1 12
1.1. Iran – Historical Overview …………………………………………………………………….. 2 13
1.2. Amnesty International ………………………………………………………………………….. 9 14
1.3. Events of November 2019 in the Islamic Republic of Iran ………………….. 12 15
1.4. Research Questions ……………………………………………………………………………. 13 16+4
Findings ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 16 ¹⁷
1. Justice for Victims of the November 2019 Events in the Islamic Republic of Iran … 17 ¹⁸
1. Forced Confessions in the Islamic Republic of Iran ……………………………… 18 ¹⁹
1. Give Them a Voice – Amnesty Movement Campaign ……………………………… 19 ²⁰
Discussion: The Universal Discourse on Justice vs. The Particular Discourse … 20 ²¹
1. Critique of the Universal Discourse of International Organizations ……….. 21 22
  3.1. Conclusions ………………………………………………………………………………………… 24 23
  3.2. Theoretical Implications ……………………………………………………………………… 26 24
  3.3. Practical Implications ………………………………………………………………………….. 28 25+3
1. References ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 30 ²⁶
1. Appendices …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 32 ²⁷
1. Further Reading on Political Prisoners and Executions in the Islamic Republic of Iran … 40 ²⁸

1.

Introduction ²⁹

The Islamic Republic of Iran has maintained a theocratic regime since 1979, the year of the Islamic Revolution, which drove the Shah Pahlavi (Reza Shah Pahlavi) into exile in the United States and brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power in his place. ³⁰ Khomeini established a regime in Iran based on the principle of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) and intended to liberate Iran from foreign influences originating in the West, which were claimed to be imperialist and colonialist in nature. Khomeini sought to “restore the crown to its former glory,” meaning to preserve Iran’s unique religious characteristics even at the cost of rejecting modern customs and ways of life. He argued that the imported Western law (expressed in Pahlavi’s legal reforms) must be replaced by Islamic law, and that this would lead to the establishment of a utopian society in the spirit of religious values, a society of order and harmony. ³¹

The Iranian regime of Khomeini places the protection of the Islamic State’s existence at the top of its priorities, even at the cost of deviation and change in the original Islamic law (Mayer, 2002). The law ceased to be “Islamic law” and became a political law aimed at suppressing regime opponents, with the religious mantle providing it legitimacy. ³²This is not a democratic law because it was written by clerics. ³³The common people are not allowed to make their voices heard or influence the way the law is formed. ³⁴Corrupt judges, suppression of opponents, and systematic violation of rights—all these have led to a sense of alienation among Iranians from the legal system and a challenge to the regime’s legitimacy. ³⁵

The regime struggles with waves of popular protest which stem, it is argued, from the aspiration of Iranian citizens to enjoy human rights and democracy in their universal sense. ³⁶Iran serves as a case study for the universality of human rights (Mayer, 2000). ³⁷ The United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Agnes Callamard, describes the regime’s conduct in these words: “There are repeated waves of protest and violent repression, which indicates that the regime in Iran creates a situation where it does not listen, is not willing to learn, to change, and is not willing to take responsibility.” (Callamard, 2020) ³⁸

Conversely, some argue that the criticism by the UN representative constitutes an infringement on the sovereignty of a nation-state, meaning interference in its internal affairs. ³⁹The attempt to impose on Iran norms, standards, and values of human rights that originate in the West is imperialist and colonialist in essence, a continuation of the civilizing discourse in which the settler strives to improve the native’s culture. ⁴⁰The criminal act harms the sovereign, and the sacred right to punish its enemies stems from its sovereignty. ⁴¹Sovereignty has special meaning in the post-colonial era because it is an expression of the nation-state’s right to self-determination. ⁴²

1.1.

Iran – Historical Overview ⁴³

Nineteenth-century Iran was a monarchy ruled by a Shiite Shah from the Qajar dynasty. ⁴⁴ Two court systems operated in the kingdom at that time. The first system was called “Urf.” ⁴⁵ The “Urf” was a state court that dealt exclusively with state matters. The second system was the “Sharia” court. ⁴⁶The Sharia courts were religious courts where clerics judged matters of morality and criminal law. ⁴⁷The separation between the religious court and the state court was not hermetic. ⁴⁸ In both instances, the authority to appoint judges was held by the Shah. Prisons did not exist then because most punishments were corporal punishments administered immediately. ⁴⁹Until sentencing, the accused were held in dungeons. ⁵⁰

The demand for social justice and democracy was a constitutive part of the discourse of various movements that operated to promote political modernity since the early nineteenth century, through the establishment of nation-states emerging from the old empires of Europe and the decolonization of Asia and Africa. ⁵¹ (Vahabazadeh, 2017, p. 289). In the context of Iran, struggles for social justice were unique in that they included a demand for the collective rights of minorities (women, ethnic minorities). ⁵²

Iran experienced four important political events during the twentieth century: ⁵³

The Constitutional Revolution 1906-1911 ⁵⁴
The popular and democratic movement centered on oil nationalization between 1951 and 1953 ⁵⁵
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 ⁵⁶
The Reform Movement (1997-2009) ⁵⁷

The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911 ⁵⁸The main demands of the Constitutional Revolution, known as Mashruteh (‘Conditionality’), were to limit the absolute rule of the Qajar Shah and establish a democratic government. ⁵⁹This democratic government operated in Iran between the years 1941-1953 (Asghari p. 262). ⁶⁰Alongside its anti-authoritarian tendencies, the goal of the Constitutional Revolution was the democratic construction of a nation-state, as a modern project, through the establishment of the rule of law, a parliament, and an independent judiciary. ⁶¹ The revolutionaries hoped then that such a state would succeed in overcoming a semi-colonial situation, in within which Iran operated as a buffer zone between the interest zones of Russia and Britain (Alizadeh, 2009). The Democratic Front of Iran, established in 1909, emphasized civil liberties anchored in a constitution: freedom of speech, association, and press, and equality between citizens regardless of religion, race, sex, and nationality. ⁶²

The involvement of women in the movement led to the radicalization of the movement toward a social-democratic direction (Vahabazadeh, 2017, p. 294). ⁶³The struggle for workers’ rights, gender, economic, and religious justice increased alongside the struggle for democratic citizenship throughout the stormy years of the movement’s activity (Ibid). ⁶⁴In 1925, the Shah of the Qajar house was finally overthrown, and in his place rose the Shah Pahlavi who ruled Iran until 1979. ⁶⁵

The Popular and Democratic Movement centered on Oil Nationalization (1951-1953) ⁶⁶During World War II, occupation by several powers led to the establishment of a semi-democratic government that operated in Iran between 1941-1953, ⁶⁷ and to a temporary suspension of the Shah’s rule (Asghari p. 262). A coalition between Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and Ayatollah Kashani enabled the nationalization of oil fields. ⁶⁸This coalition won the support of the Marxist “Tudeh” party, which was home to many of the secular left, and which later became the official agent of Moscow. ⁶⁹However, apart from opening a space for political participation and resistance to colonial forces, this movement also clashed with the young Shah Pahlavi, who sought assistance from beyond the country’s borders. ⁷⁰

The Pahlavi dynasty, which came to power in Iran in 1925, ruled while blatantly violating modern norms of political, economic, and social justice. ⁷¹A constitutional government served as a fig leaf for a modern dictatorship with a house of representatives (Majlis). ⁷²Reza Shah’s monarchy was a military monarchy, not a monarchy imbued with ideology. ⁷³Iran became a Westernizing state under the rule of the Pahlavi dynasty between the years 1925-1979 (Afshari). ⁷⁴ Shah Pahlavi improved transportation and communication infrastructure, and this was his contribution to Iran’s modernization (Asghari 262). Reza Shah Pahlavi’s legal reforms turned incarceration into a bureaucratic necessity. With the rise of the modern state, the new elites viewed torture and executions as barbaric remnants of the Middle Ages. Public executions ceased. The regime did not try to impress the people with scenes of horror. Now the state was armed with all the components of a modern government—central bureaucracy, a ready army, and a national police force. In December 1978, the vague system of hostility toward the Shah, because of his dependence on the West, his authoritarianism, and forced modernization, turned into a clear slogan: Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic instead of “Islamic Government.” ⁷⁵

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 ⁷⁶The main social forces in the revolution were feudal lords with nationalist tendencies, a new bourgeoisie, merchants, cultural elites with modernist or socialist tendencies, and senior clerics from the theological seminary in Najaf. ⁷⁷A broad coalition of seemingly opposing forces has been a constant feature of progressive movements in Iran ever since. ⁷⁸The 1979 revolution was an unprecedented mass movement that, despite the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini—a leadership that was undisputed at the time—largely served as a home for all internal social forces: religious factions, those with modernist or traditional tendencies, secularists, liberal-nationalists, and Marxists joined hands and forces in a joint revolutionary effort – not only to produce a coalition but to “produce” one solidary nation despite ethnic, religious, and class differences (Alizadeh, 2009). ⁷⁹

The clerical government established by Khomeini was convinced that for the rule of Islamic law to prevail in the land, Muslim judges must be given maximum authority. ⁸⁰Some Iranians imagined that the rule of Islamic law meant traditional rule of law, predating politics, of learned clerics consulting with each other to reach the best decision. ⁸¹Academics in the West viewed the implications of the Islamic Revolution through the lens of cultural relativism: they wanted to believe that the Muslim jurist could indeed serve as a guardian and protector of human rights and that the source of the oppression and corruption that characterized the Shah’s rule was destructive Western imperialism. ⁸²

Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor, was quoted as saying “The meaning of justice is that Allah chooses a special person, like Imam Ali, to lead the people” (Mayer, 2002, p. 124). ⁸³ A return to authentic Islamic values was seen as a guarantee for social justice. The religious piety of the sovereign constitutes a guarantee for the propriety of his governance (Ibid). ⁸⁴According to the Shiite Islamic tradition, justice (Adalat in Persian) is one of the attributes of God. ⁸⁵Islamic law in the Islamic Republic of Iran is guaranteed through the governance system of Velayat-e Faqih, the Islamic jurist (Ibid). ⁸⁶The Supreme Spiritual Leader of Iran is the “Velayat-e Faqih” (The Islamic Jurist), the eternal guardian of the nation, the spiritual father, and the mediator between God and man. ⁸⁷

The Islamic jurist walks in the ways of Imam Ali and fills his place on earth. ⁸⁸Ali was the in-law of the Prophet Muhammad and is considered the Commander of the Faithful; he ruled the Islamic community for a short period between 651-656. ⁸⁹ He is also called “Amir al-Mu’minin” (Commander of the Faithful). For Shiites, he is the rightful successor to Muhammad. ⁹⁰Rulers need to learn to recognize the qualities of Imam Ali and strive to emulate them. ⁹¹ The Commander of the Faithful enjoyed the highest level of personal justice. Imam Ali’s government was the perfect government. ⁹²Ali was an example and model that personal justice means social justice, and could teach politicians in the world what justice and good governance are. ⁹³Khamenei said this while extolling the Imam’s virtues and justice as a religious principle in Islam. ⁹⁴

In January 1998, Khamenei declared that the Islamic State, and he as the Supreme Judge heading it, enjoys absolute power to take all necessary measures to advance its interests – even if these seemingly contradict Islamic law (Mayer, 2002, p. 125). ⁹⁵ Thereby empowering himself to act without legal limits. This declaration authorized him to perform acts contrary to the principles of Islamic law. ⁹⁶The conservatives in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with Khamenei’s support, controlled and still control institutions where citizens have no right to vote: they control the courts, the army, the broadcasting authority, the police, and security forces, and a host of unofficial groups that allow them to enforce their will, and thus, for example, to thwart the constitutional reforms that President Khatami tried to pass later (Ibid). ⁹⁷To this day, the clerical elites are not democratically elected and are not accountable to a democratically elected body (Alizadeh, 2009). ⁹⁸Although conservatives sometimes try to outwardly adopt a discourse of human rights, they undermine the rule of law when they use Revolutionary Courts to carry out political revenge (Mayer, 2002, p. 127). ⁹⁹Intellectuals point to the risk stemming from the Ayatollahs having so many powers, none of which are granted democratically, but rather by virtue of the combination of state and religion. ¹⁰⁰

The Reform Movement 1997-2009 ¹⁰¹In the two election campaigns of 1997 and 2009, the ruling bloc tried to make its rule absolute through the monopolization of all elected and non-elected institutions. ¹⁰² Khamenei gave his open support to the hardliners. The totalization of power was indeed less explicit in the 1997 elections, but since 2004 Khamenei has moved openly toward the absolutist state—with the help of theological interpretations of the “Council of Guardians” (Velayat-e Mutlaq-e Faqih) and through figures like Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi and the growing empowerment of the Revolutionary Guards (Alizadeh, 2009). ¹⁰³

In a speech given by Iranian President Khatami on May 23, 1997, he claimed that clerics manipulate religion for their own purposes. ¹⁰⁴ A series of murders eliminated prominent regime opponents and secular writers (Ibid). This was parallel to political trials and censorship exercised by conservatives against their political rivals (Mayer, 2002 p. 130). ¹⁰⁵Starting in 1999, conservatives in Iran began to use harsh repressive measures against the protesting student population: conservatives persecuted them, arrested them, put them on trial, and sometimes even set security force personnel upon them. ¹⁰⁶ Use was also made of firing squads (Mayer, 2002; 2003, p. 121).

When Iran’s youth expressed dissatisfaction with the trampling of democracy in the name of political Islam and began taking part in Reformist movement demonstrations, Iranian judges acted as agents of conservative forces in the Islamic Republic of Iran and sought to suppress the protest. Regularly, confessions extracted from political prisoners under duress were used to convict them. Reformists and dissidents in Iran suffered from repression and terror which sometimes escalated into direct violence by hawkish conservative squads. As Iranians became more fed up with arbitrary political law, conservative forces in the regime acted to reduce freedom of the press. The disillusionment ¹⁰⁷with political law caused and still causes many Iranians to yearn for a constitution determined by the people and a government elected by the people and guided by constitutional principles and institutions overseeing the application of the constitution (Mayer, 2002, p. 212). ¹⁰⁸

Let us now turn to the law in the Islamic Republic of Iran today. 109

The law in the Islamic Republic of Iran is hybrid and eclectic. That is, it contains elements of political, traditional, and professional law (see Appendix). 110The orientation of the legal system in the Islamic Republic of Iran is French, as it was in the days of Shah Reza Pahlavi. 111Remnants of medieval traditional law exist in Iranian law. 112For example, a man is allowed to marry an unlimited number of “temporary wives,” and financial compensation for injury to a woman is half the financial compensation for injury to a man. 113 Murder is considered a private offense between the victim’s family and the murderer. The victim’s family is entitled to decide if they are interested in financial compensation or blood revenge. 114+4

Iran also has laws and institutions that testify to an aspiration for professional rule of law, for example, constitutional articles guaranteeing the lives and dignity of human beings under conditions detailed in the law, prohibition of questioning people or attacking them due to their beliefs, limiting sentences to courts competent to issue them according to law, the presumption of innocence until guilt is proven, and prohibition of extracting confessions by force and torture. ¹¹⁵Due to the clash between different types of law, the justice system is plagued by instability and failures (Mayer, 2002, p. 121). ¹¹⁶Conservative Ayatollahs use political law to suppress their rivals and opponents (Mayer, 2002, p. 123), and publicly use Islam to grant legitimacy to their regime and the cruel sentences they issue against their political opponents. ¹¹⁷

As a result of political persecution, some reformists who opposed the conservatives were imprisoned, others emigrated, and others found refuge in civil society institutions, such as non-governmental organizations focusing on human rights policy. ¹¹⁸ (Alizadeh, 2009). The Revolutionary Guards currently play a significant role in the Iranian political system, as well as in the economy. ¹¹⁹In recent years, the political involvement of the Revolutionary Guards has been increasing, and they tend to stand with the conservatives. ¹²⁰When the clerics give the order to suppress demonstrations using force, the Revolutionary Guards are the ones executing these orders. ¹²¹ (Zimmt, 2020). ¹²²

Mohammad Jafari, commander of the Revolutionary Guards, claims that the Revolutionary Guards are not a one-dimensional military organization, and that their mission is to guard the revolution and its achievements against domestic enemies. ¹²³ Later, Jafari described the Revolutionary Guards as an organization that is not “strictly military” but also “political and ideological.” Jafari claimed that the most significant threat to the Islamic Revolution is in the political arena, and that the Revolutionary Guards, committed to protecting the revolution’s achievements, cannot remain silent in the face of this threat. It seems that the current protest increases the sense of threat on the part of the Iranian regime, especially in light of the ongoing protest in Iraq and Lebanon, and strengthens its recognition of the need to increase efforts to suppress any potential threat to its stability. The regime has prepared in recent years for the possibility of renewed protest, holds significant suppression capabilities, and is ready to use them if necessary. These capabilities are particularly effective given the difficulty of turning ¹²⁴ the protest into an organized movement with leadership that can offer a political alternative to the current regime. The regime also enjoys, as in the past, the ability to divert at least some of the public criticism toward the government and present the President as responsible for the economic crisis. Nevertheless, the wave of protest points again to the intensity of public frustration, fed by growing mistrust among citizens toward the authorities and their failure to provide effective solutions to citizens’ distress. In conclusion, the Iranian authorities currently face a complex dilemma. ¹²⁵On one hand, they are committed to austerity measures and economic efficiency to reduce the budget deficit while addressing the impact of sanctions. ¹²⁶On the other hand, these measures are liable to increase the economic distress of citizens and intensify popular protest (Zimmt, 2020). ¹²⁷

1.2.

Amnesty International ¹²⁸

Transnational organizations shape the agenda and behavior of states (Boli, 1997, p. 184). Individuals acting as transnational citizens succeeded in persuading nation-states to implement new principles for the humane treatment of prisoners through the Red Cross organization (1860). ¹²⁹They can also be called “norm entrepreneurs,” or “meaning agents” who operate through the platforms of international organizations (Finnemore, 1998). ¹³⁰These principles of respect for the individual, even if he is an enemy soldier, and the commitment to protect non-combatant civilians who assist in fighting when needed, stem directly from structures of “world culture” such as universality, individualism, and global citizenship. ¹³¹Institutions of the international community develop norms and aspirations which are encoded into the United Nations Charter of Human Rights, detailing the natural rights and duties belonging to all human beings (Boli, 1997). ¹³²

A norm is appropriate and desirable behavior for an actor with a certain identity. ¹³³The norm regarding human rights is “encoded” within the UN Charter of Human Rights. ¹³⁴“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy… Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion… Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of ¹³⁵ frontiers. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly” (Boli, 1997, p. 182). ¹³⁶

The United Nations established fundamental principles in the form of the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948), but even when the charter was written, government representatives sitting on the Human Rights Commission held no power to respond to specific complaints about human ¹³⁷rights violations. States did not allow the United Nations to interfere in their internal affairs, especially not in embarrassing violations of human rights. Practical measures intended to give life to human rights principles lagged behind the rhetoric. Amnesty International declares its goal—to turn the Declaration of Human Rights from a theoretical vision into reality. ¹³⁸

Human rights organizations try to influence the behavior of nation-states without having the resources and tools available to the latter. ¹³⁹They have no enforcement capability: they have no army or police, nor control over economic resources allowing the imposition of sanctions. ¹⁴⁰“Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 7 million people who campaign for a world where human rights are enjoyed by all. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights… We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion… We are funded by members and public donations.” ¹⁴¹

In informal conversations, some activists on social networks tend to criticize international organizations, which seemingly appear to have no “teeth.” ¹⁴² Governments jealously guard their sovereignty. The criminal act attacks the sovereign and insults him. ¹⁴³The sovereign’s intervention is a direct answer to the crime, which turns the criminal into an enemy of the sovereign. ¹⁴⁴ The right to punish is like an aspect of the sovereign’s right to make war on his enemies (Foucault, 1975, p. 62). The sovereignty of the nation-state is the actual realization of its right to self-determination. ¹⁴⁵In light of the West’s colonial past, a system of norms is required that limits the right of one nation-state to intervene in the governance of another state, even if this intervention is considered intervention from a humanitarian motive, out of good intentions. ¹⁴⁶

Amnesty International strives to eliminate the gap between human rights principles and their actual implementation. Tools for creating human rights norms include treaties, monitoring and investigation mechanisms, guidelines for implementation, and perhaps most importantly – consensus regarding the question of to what extent the principle of non-intervention and preservation of sovereignty allows states to ignore international criticism. ¹⁴⁷International organizations like Amnesty define international human rights norms and standards and work to anchor them in national law as well as to mobilize public opinion against cases where prisoners are incarcerated for beliefs and opinions they expressed, provided they were not involved in personal violence or advocated for it (Clark, 2002). ¹⁴⁸

Amnesty achieved consultative status with the United Nations in 1964. To set an international standard in the field of human rights, the organization expanded its activities and also established a legal department. Amnesty International shaped many of the techniques now shared by many national non-governmental organizations. ¹⁴⁹The organization developed proven tactics for establishing international letter-writing networks, tactics that many transnational activists use against governments and businesses and in favor of protecting the environment, workers’ rights, and other causes. ¹⁵⁰The number of groups dealing with human rights has grown since Amnesty was established, but the combination of public international membership and transnational activism is unique even relative to other human rights organizations. ¹⁵¹Three attributes affect the organization’s ability to fix norms: loyalty to moral principles of human rights, maintaining a position as an autonomous third party devoid of interest as an actor in the international system, and using expertise and large amounts of information. ¹⁵²These attributes grant legitimacy to Amnesty and allow it to become a model for other international organizations. ¹⁵³

1.3.

Events of November 2019 in the Islamic Republic of Iran ¹⁵⁴

The renewal of economic sanctions against Iran in November 2018, and even more so the cancellation of the permit for several countries to purchase oil from Iran in May 2019, led, as expected, to a worsening of Iran’s already shaky economic situation. ¹⁵⁵The worsening economic crisis forced the government to now implement some of the austerity measures planned in the past, despite the assessment that the decision would spark public protest, especially in light of ongoing popular protests in Iraq and Lebanon, which increased concern among Iranian authorities about demonstrations spilling over into their territory. ¹⁵⁶Against this background, they apparently chose to publish the decision to raise fuel prices at midnight between Thursday and Friday, on the weekend in Iran. ¹⁵⁷

On November 15, 2019, protests erupted all over Iran following the government’s announcement of a significant hike in fuel prices announced overnight. ¹⁵⁸Protesters expressed anger that the new decree would hurt the weakened classes already struggling to survive the economic crisis in the country. ¹⁵⁹Many shouted radical slogans calling for a complete change of the system of government, including constitutional reforms and an end to the rule of the Islamic Jurist in the state. ¹⁶⁰Some protesters even set fire to pictures of the current Spiritual Leader of Iran and his predecessor. ¹⁶¹On November 16, 2019, demonstrations resumed with greater intensity all over the country. ¹⁶²In response, Iranian authorities imposed an almost total blackout on the internet in the country by blocking internet service providers. ¹⁶³The monitoring and data project at the University of California noticed a significant drop in data traffic from the Islamic Republic of Iran. ¹⁶⁴

At 7 PM, Iran plunged into darkness – after hours of data research and fact-checking, Amnesty International managed to verify and confirm the deaths of 304 people killed by security forces fire between November 15 and 19, 2019. More than 220 of these deaths occurred within a span of two days when the regime in Iran blocked citizens’ access to the internet. ¹⁶⁵In Iran, as elsewhere, the blackout prevented not only access to information but also the possibility of sharing information with the outside world and telling what the regime is doing to citizens. ¹⁶⁶The blackout constitutes an obstacle for researchers seeking to know the truth about crimes and human rights violations committed, the identities of victims and perpetrators, and the true number of victims. ¹⁶⁷

1.4.

Research Questions ¹⁶⁸

The role of international organizations is to promote the implementation, acceptance, and containment of international norms in various fields, for example in the field of human rights. ¹⁶⁹ (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). The question arises – what are the tools and possibilities available to activists in international organizations to act to change norms regarding human rights and democracy in the context of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a sovereign nation-state with a history of negative colonial and imperialist influences (e.g., the 1953 coup that led to the overthrow of the Mosaddegh government – which occurred under CIA auspices). ¹⁷⁰Given that norms of humanitarian intervention, i.e., intervention coming to benefit and improve the welfare of the other, dictate prohibitions and limitations on the ways in which one can act without violating the nation-state’s right to self-determination. ¹⁷¹

Iran’s history as a modern nation-state is saturated with imperialist interventions, for example, the occupation of Iran by Russia and England in World War I, and CIA involvement in the coup that brought down the Mosaddegh government in 1953. ¹⁷²Is it possible to act for the human rights of citizens in Iran without this activity being part of an essentially oppressive world order? ¹⁷³ The way to do this ostensibly is through persuasion and not coercion. An international organization is naturally devoid of economic or military resources to impose the norms it tries to promote. ¹⁷⁴

2.

Findings ¹⁷⁵

Amnesty’s expertise allows it to deal with quantities of information considered reliable, interest-free information. ¹⁷⁶Analysis of “means of persuasion” includes reading the organizations’ online publications – reports, position papers, and “sentimental” campaigns designed to influence public opinion through an appeal to the emotion of empathy. ¹⁷⁷According to an Amnesty report “Trampling Humanity: Mass Arrests, Disappearances and Torture” (September 2020), ¹⁷⁸arrested protesters underwent torture including beatings and floggings, electric shocks, fixing the body in agonizing positions causing stress, mock executions, injection of chemical substances, waterboarding, sexual harassment, and denial of medical treatment. ¹⁷⁹Some of the detainees are just teenagers, the youngest being ten years old. ¹⁸⁰Some were kidnapped by security forces while seeking medical treatment in hospitals. ¹⁸¹The state news network broadcasted in some cases the confessions of torture victims. ¹⁸²

According to the organization, they possess the names of five hundred detainees among the protesters who underwent torture during their detention. ¹⁸³ Amnesty researchers interviewed about sixty survivors of detention under torture and also performed analysis and verification of photos and videos taken during the 2019 protests. The demonstrations lasted only five days but the arrests that followed continued for many more days. ¹⁸⁴The evidence that led to the conviction of prisoners sentenced to death is non-existent to fabricated, they claim. ¹⁸⁵Protesters feel that those sentenced to death are being punished for crimes and offenses which they too committed or could have committed. ¹⁸⁶Three young protesters – Saeed Tamjidi, Mohammad Rajabi, and Amir Hossein Moradi, for example, were convicted of “Moharebeh” – war against God, and sentenced to death. ¹⁸⁷Iranian wrestler Navid Afkari, who was executed in September 2020, was also convicted inter alia of this offense, according to the Human Rights Watch report. ¹⁸⁸Additional charges carrying prison sentences are insulting the Supreme Leader of Iran Seyyed Ali Khamenei and spreading propaganda against the state regime. ¹⁸⁹

Justice for Victims of the November 2019 Events in the Islamic Republic of Iran 190Agnes Callamard, UN representative, said the following things: 191

(https://www.facebook.com/watchparty/412083213255419/) 192″An independent investigation of human rights violations in Iran is required, not only regarding events that happened in November 2019 but also regarding events that occurred in 2018 as well as the events of 2009. 193In the decade that has passed since the 2009 events, there has been a decline in Iran’s willingness to take responsibility for the violent repressive acts it commits. 194 Justice is first of all toward the families of the victims. Their right to receive compensation for the death of their loved ones. 195But sometimes payment of compensation to families constitutes hush money, the opposite of what is required to conduct an independent investigation regarding the death of their loved ones. 196 Justice requires remembering that victims have names and faces and life stories. It is easy to forget them when there are so many of them. 197Furthermore, geopolitical tensions create a difference between blood and blood and cause the names and faces of Iranian victims to be forgotten more easily. 198A significant part of the process of doing justice is to serve as a voice for the voiceless, those who lost their lives, and since they are not alive, there is no one to demand justice for them. 199 Any process of doing justice must begin with their memory. And any process of taking responsibility must take them into account. 200+4

It is forbidden to let an official narrative full of lies be heard without answering it. ²⁰¹Documentation of video clips shows Iranian security forces personnel firing live ammunition at non-violent and unarmed protesters, who posed no danger to anyone. ²⁰²Thereby the Iranian regime violated its citizens’ right to life and the right that life not be taken from them arbitrarily. ²⁰³Taking responsibility exists on two levels: on one hand, one needs to investigate who the “little murderers” are, who are the people who pulled the trigger and performed the shooting. ²⁰⁴ When, how, where, and under what circumstances it happened. Justice and taking responsibility require remembering the victims, their names, their faces, their stories. ²⁰⁵The Iranian regime only maintained a semblance of investigation and a semblance of justice. ²⁰⁶Violations of human rights happen despite international criticism and condemnation.” ²⁰⁷

The Forced Confession in the Islamic Republic of Iran ²⁰⁸In June 2020, FIDH, an international non-governmental organization (INGO), published a report based on in-depth interviews with torture victims. ²⁰⁹Between the years 2009-2019, Iran broadcasted on the IRIB network, which has a monopoly on radio and television broadcasts, and on other networks, confessions extracted by force and under torture as well as defamatory material against 505 other people. ²¹⁰ Broadcasting forced confessions is considered torture. Among the prisoners who fell victim to this practice: human rights defenders, journalists, minority activists, regime opponents, dual nationals. ²¹¹ The report is based on an analysis of one hundred and fifty programs broadcast on the network and thirteen in-depth interviews with victims. One thousand five hundred hours were invested in analyzing these findings and producing them. ²¹²Abdul Rahman Khan, chairman of FIDH, claims that the time has come for the international community to pressure the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran to end this practice, which is a source of painful human rights violations in many cases. ²¹³

Give Them a Voice – Amnesty Movement Campaign 214

(https://ciluna27.wordpress.com/2020/11/18/give-them-a-voice-join-our-campaign-for-iranian-prisoners-of-conscience/) 215In this campaign, activists on social networks all over the world were asked the following request: 216″We have on the site a number of texts written by Iranian prisoners. Please choose a poem or letter, read it in your voice and record yourself. 217You can use the phone or computer camera or you can also use Zoom and choose the prisoner’s picture as the background (so your face won’t be seen). 218You can also set your profile picture as the prisoner’s picture. 219Alternatively, you can record only audio if you are really uncomfortable or if you have technical difficulties. 220The desired video length is no more than two minutes, so as not to lose listeners’ attention. 221Tag Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran, and Khamenei in your tweets with the specific hashtag, or the Iranian embassy in your country, or politicians in your country. 222Let them know that prisoners cannot be silenced, they have a voice through campaigners from all over the world. 223If there are specific accounts campaigning for this specific prisoner, tag them too. 224Also use the hashtags #freeNazanin #FreeGolrokh #FreeAtena for the prisoner, retweet, share tweets from the relevant hashtag. 225Please try to support more than one prisoner. 226Share and invite your friends to participate in the campaign too.” 227+4

3.

Discussion: The Universal Discourse on Justice vs. The Particular Discourse ²²⁸

A norm is a standard of behavior considered appropriate for an actor with a certain identity (Finnemore, 1998). The norm can be a local norm, a regional norm, or an international one. A norm can start its path as local and later be accepted and become international. A local norm can clash and compete with international norms. Violation of international norms harms the legitimacy of a nation-state and the degree of its acceptance as a member of the global society (Finnemore, 1998). Dealing with anthropology is dealing with the mediation of universal discourse and its adaptation to the particular characteristics of the local community so as to enable communication between it and the international community and local authorities (Lowe and Merry, 2010). ²²⁹

In a situation where there is competition between a local norm and an international norm, persuasion work is required so that the nation-state accepts the international norm, without this being perceived as a violation of norms from another field, norms of post-colonization which emphasize respect for the nation-state’s sovereignty and its right to self-determination. ²³⁰The post-colonial discourse that the involved anthropologist tries to promote emphasizes the particular and context, and reading every situation according to the variety of ways people choose to live within it. ²³¹ Although anthropological literature is increasingly involved in a universal discourse of reform, such as human rights and international humanitarianism, there is also resistance to universality, because it allegedly serves as a cover for cultural erasure (Ibid). The emphasis placed by the academic researcher or activist on local knowledge and local agency might cause the silencing of criticism regarding political institutions in post-colonial society. A norm is not an absolute truth and sometimes a norm from one field (post-colonialism) may clash with a norm from another field (humanitarian norms). ²³²

On one hand, one must protect people’s right to live in unique ways and manners and be distinct from one another, and on the other hand, one must assist oppressed groups to demand their rights using the universal rights discourse. ²³³Activist discourse, such as organizations like Amnesty tend to promote, frames human experience in universal terms, focusing on personal stories of harm and not on exposing structures of injustice underlying these stories. ²³⁴This can be observed through the use of private cases of specific prisoners, with names and photos on social networks, cases which seemingly appear detached from their historical and social context. ²³⁵

Critique of the Universal Discourse of International Organizations ²³⁶The discourse of human rights and democracy developed in a particular cultural context of the revolutions in France and America. ²³⁷Its critics argue that this discourse is actually a “laundered version” of the civilizing colonialist discourse in which the colonialist strives to improve the native’s culture. ²³⁸Furthermore, it is argued that international organizations reproduce existing power orders in global society in their activity and preserve patterns of domination. ²³⁹The senior managers of international organizations are people from stronger countries who ostensibly exert “soft power” over weakened states (Beckfield, 2010, p. 1026). ²⁴⁰Falk argues that Iranians need traditional values of the religion of Islam, a religion that emphasizes maintaining harmony and social order rather than human rights and democracy (Falk, 1992, in Mayer, 2000, p. 522). ²⁴¹Samuel Huntington believes that Muslim culture and Western culture are on a collision course with each other, and Islamic values cannot align with Western liberalism. ²⁴²

When Iranian activists on social networks raise demands for human rights and democracy in their homeland, it is argued that they are a minority of “cultural traitors” who do not represent the “authentic voice” of the Iranian people. ²⁴³ (Mayer, 2000, p. 522). In this particularist approach advocating cultural relativism, there is a fallacy and double standard because it treats acts of human rights violations in the West as outrageous, but when done in the East treats them as forgivable and tolerable (Mayer, 2000, p. 523). ²⁴⁴Reza Afshari conducted an experiment where he presented a story about a human rights violation to a class of students as an event that occurred in Canada and Iran. ²⁴⁵The students reacted to the same event with shock in the context of Canada, and with equanimity in the case of Iran. ²⁴⁶ Orientalism causes a lack of objectivity, double standards. There is inequality in the distribution of resources of empathy, of attention regarding the suffering of individuals in non-Western cultures versus Western cultures. ²⁴⁷

Activism ²⁴⁸The question of the moral responsibility of the individual as a global citizen exposed to the suffering of citizens from different nation-states becomes more important as the individual empowers himself as an actor in global society. ²⁴⁹An individual can feel a sense of ideological obligation to other human beings out of a sense of shared humanity (Finnemore, 1998). ²⁵⁰Social networks have become a tool through which the resonance of voices less represented in the media can be amplified, confronting accepted narratives in the media and challenging them. ²⁵¹ (Robinson 2010). Citizens can make their voices heard, challenge institutional authority, express other emotions, bypass limitations and censorship of traditional and commercial media. ²⁵²

In the case of Iran, due to geopolitical tensions and a colonial past, it seems ostensibly that the issue of “external intervention” and action to change existing punishment norms becomes particularly charged. ²⁵³Howard (2010) tracked interactions on social networks by location and time and saw that conversations about revolutionary activities increase around events and then spread beyond international borders of North Africa and the Middle East, connecting transnational groups and individuals. ²⁵⁴The platforms allow users to tell their stories, whether in short text messages or by creating fully documentary videos. ²⁵⁵The connection between local activists and international activists may turn into a dialogue aiming for social change. ²⁵⁶

The strategic potential of Twitter may strengthen the visibility and symbolic power of the struggle for social justice. ²⁵⁷Contemporary Amnesty “adoption groups” use social media to tell the story of adopted prisoners of conscience and work for their release, and also to spread stories of victims of human rights violations by the Iranian regime. ²⁵⁸Viral use of tags (hashtags) motivated famous public figures to support the protest movement even if they were not initially directly involved in it. ²⁵⁹Increased awareness of issues raised by protest movements on social networks can move their discourse toward a more public sphere where organizational and governmental changes may happen (Blevins, 2019). ²⁶⁰

However, it is also argued that social media eats facts voraciously. It chews them and regurgitates them. ²⁶¹Technology itself influences our understanding of facts, mainly because of its speed and size. ²⁶²The internet itself has made facts less and less accessible, because every fact competes against contradictory facts. ²⁶³For example, against Amnesty’s claims of the innocence of those sentenced to death, government news networks in Iran also produced explanatory materials describing those sentenced to death as cruel murderers. ²⁶⁴Thus, for example, in the case of Navid Afkari – the Tasnim news network broadcast a video linking him to the murder of a security guard and describing him as a violent protester. ²⁶⁵

According to Callamard, “In a world that has never looked more virtual, it is easier to turn the obvious into controversial. ‘Fake news’ and hate speech in the public sphere cause a loss of trust in facts. New social situations influence these beliefs and present beliefs, rumors, and false narratives as facts. Cyber troops, fake accounts, and bots manipulate public opinion to create consensus and harm democratic processes. In most lands, this includes spreading junk news and disinformation during election campaigns, military crises, and humanitarian disasters. Sometimes individuals and leaders use the unprecedented possibilities of technology opportunistically to spread ideas and ideologies that would not have had such distribution or ²⁶⁶ such a large audience otherwise. Iranian government officials and state news agencies also hold accounts on the social network Twitter, through which they try to present the official narrative, their narrative. According to the regime’s claim, the protesters who were shot were violent rioters and in most cases the use of live fire was proportionate. Agnes Callamard, the UN investigator, called this narrative a ‘narrative full of lies’.” ²⁶⁷

It is argued that the main victims of the information age are social institutions and facts. ²⁶⁸Social media has not only weakened the central role of epistemic authorities. ²⁶⁹On the contrary, it enabled the creation of “knowledge” and “fact” communities with their own leaders and authority, strengthening and consolidating them using bots, trolls, and fake accounts when needed. ²⁷⁰The information technology revolution influenced the ability of UN fact-checkers to find an audience. ²⁷¹ Weaponizing the internet ostensibly means there is no audience for facts. Public opinion is ready not only to believe lies but also to accept their consequences. “Fact-finding is a practice of humanity. We must challenge the lies and we are all involved in this” (Callamard, 2020). ²⁷²

3.1.

Conclusions ²⁷³

According to Mahdavi (2017), the discourse of human rights and democracy is an essential and rooted part of Iran itself, existing since the founding of Iran as a modern nation-state. ²⁷⁴Iran has known four revolutions in the last century alone, and revolutionary forces in Iran struggling to realize a vision of social justice and human rights are part of Iran’s history and culture no less than Shiite Islam. ²⁷⁵Bayat (2007) suggests to us that instead of asking the essentialist, abstract, and cliché question of whether local culture or religion aligns with democracy, we should ask the following questions: How do people make their traditional, cultural, and religious values align with democracy? ²⁷⁶ What social conditions are required to realize these goals? How does one participate in this process? ²⁷⁷ (Bayat in Mahdavi p. 275). Tradition and change are not concepts that contradict each other, but rather there is an ongoing and critical dialogue between local tradition and the search for global social justice. The political prisoners writing from prison in Iran and their letters being read by international activists are part of this dialogue; the demand for freedom and human rights is voiced by protesters going out to the street to protest and risking their lives. ²⁷⁸

The social approach argues that tradition/culture is a living phenomenon. Social actors give meaning to abstract ideas like democracy and human rights. ²⁷⁹Regime opponents pay a heavy price for the right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, and thus they grant value to these ideas and breathe life and meaning into them that is both local and universal. ²⁸⁰A review of Iran’s history shows that the universal discourse of human rights and democracy has existed in Iran since its establishment as a modern nation-state with the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911. ²⁸¹The achievements of this revolution caused torture to disappear from the political sphere of life in Iran for sixty years, until its return in the late reign of Shah Reza Pahlavi (late seventies). ²⁸²If indeed torture was such an essential and rooted part of Iran’s “Asian” culture, we should not have seen such a disappearance. ²⁸³

Mayer (2002) points out that the law in the Islamic Republic is perceived as “Islamic law,” as traditional law, while in fact it is a political law designed to legitimize the violent suppression of regime opponents. ²⁸⁴The return of torture to Iran preceded the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and began back in the late rule of Reza Shah, in the late seventies. ²⁸⁵It seems as if Iran belatedly went through the penal reform described by Foucault, the one that shifted emphasis from corporal punishment to incarceration and prisoner rehabilitation and evidence-based investigation procedure, and then retracted it. ²⁸⁶

3.2.

Theoretical Implications ²⁸⁷

The perception of cultural relativism is tainted with Orientalism which may lead to ignoring human suffering in non-Western countries, and conversely, the universal perception may be considered imperialist and colonialist because it ostensibly strives to improve the native culture out of a perception of European cultural superiority. ²⁸⁸A humanitarian approach aspires to rise above traditional geopolitical tensions – which divide the world into axes of resistance. ²⁸⁹ (Redfield 2008, p. 152). Redfield refers to “apolitical politics,” as a response, for example, to the tendency to turn a blind eye to human rights violations of “leftist” regimes by people of the international left. ²⁹⁰The humanitarian perception views human suffering as a negative factor which must be acted against and prevented as much as possible. ²⁹¹Finnemore proposes altruism as a shared perception of humanity connecting and motivating the individual to action as an actor acting for the welfare of the other, even if the other is a citizen of a foreign country and even if the welfare of an individual has no influence at all on his own welfare (Finnemore, 1998). ²⁹²

Activists are “norm entrepreneurs” or “meaning agents.” ²⁹³They are actors driven by empathy, altruism, and ideological commitment to the social institutions they try to promote, and they use international organizations as a platform for their activity. ²⁹⁴International organizations in turn use social networks to arouse and influence global public opinion to act for the acceptance of norms as a standard of appropriate behavior for a nation-state that is a member of the international society. ²⁹⁵Empathy arises when we put ourselves in the other’s shoes and try to imagine what he feels, even if how he feels does not directly affect our welfare. ²⁹⁶Empathy is what motivates us to altruistic action, that is, action intended to benefit the other and not to advance our own interest. ²⁹⁷Studies in psychology (Batson, 1991) show that the more people feel empathy for another individual, the more they will be ready to take altruistic action for him. ²⁹⁸Identified victim – a victim who has a name and face is a victim who generates more empathy than an anonymous victim who is merely a statistical datum. ²⁹⁹

3.3.

Practical Implications ³⁰⁰

A state cannot be made to adopt international norms by coercion but must be done through persuasion (Finnemore, 1998). ³⁰¹ Ostensibly, it seems that the regime cannot be persuaded to change its attitude toward opponents and political prisoners through pleasant means and that this must be done with other means, for example, imposing economic sanctions. Can sanctions related to human rights cause the hoped-for change? ³⁰²Iran is buckling under the burden of economic sanctions, which cause great humanitarian suffering, and have not proven themselves beneficial for policy change. ³⁰³

The Trump administration, which sought to extricate itself from the “endless” wars in the Middle East and avoid direct military friction with Iran – relied almost exclusively on sanctions. In doing so, it created a new problem of “overload” on the sanctions instrument and on the ability to extract far-reaching achievements from Iran through it. (Zimmt, 2020). Ostensibly, it seems that the desired solution regarding Iran is regime change, because the regime proves again and again that it is not willing to change its behavior. ³⁰⁴According to “Regime Change” doctrine people, replacing the rule of “Velayat-e Faqih” with a democratic and secular government is a desirable move and all means are valid to achieve it, including military intervention by a foreign country (United States). ³⁰⁵

However, such a move constitutes a unilateral violation of Iran’s sovereignty and it is doubtful if it can be justified by “humanitarian motives.” It is easier to see it as an act of imperialist aggression. Practically, there are still steps that can be taken to improve the welfare of Iranian citizens, even if these steps are acts of activists, of global citizens driven by empathy and altruism. I believe it is important to remember the names and faces of the regime’s victims and important to continue telling their story. It is important to remember what they fought for and what they sacrificed their lives for, to win and enjoy human rights in their homeland. It is important to make their voice heard in global society, even if they are silenced ³⁰⁶in their homeland. ³⁰⁷

References ³⁰⁸

[Note: Hebrew titles have been translated to English for consistency with the request; original layout preserved].

Abbott, Kenneth W. & Duncan Snidal. (1998). “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(1): 3-32 ³⁰⁹
Alizadeh, A. (2010). Why are the Iranians dreaming again? In N. Hashemi & D. Postel (Eds.), The people reloaded: The Green Movement and the struggle for Iran’s future (pp. 3–6). ³¹⁰ Brooklyn, NY: Melville House.
Amnesty, (2020) Iran: Detainees flogged, sexually abused and given electric shocks in gruesome post-protest crackdown – new report | Amnesty International ³¹¹
Afshari, R. (2002). Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran (review). Human Rights Quarterly. 24. 290-297. 10.1353/hrq.2002.0001 ³¹²
Batson, J. G., Slingsby, J. K., Harrell, K. L., Peekna, H. M., & Todd, R. M. (1991). Empathic joy and the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Journal of personality and social psychology, 61 (3), 413-426. ³¹³
Blevins, J. L., Lee, J. J., McCabe, E. E., & Edgerton, E. (2019). Tweeting for social justice in #Ferguson: Affective discourse in Twitter hashtags. new media & society, 21 (7), 1636-1653 ³¹⁴
Beckfield, J. (2010). “The social structure of the world polity.” American Journal of Sociology 115:1018-68. ³¹⁵
Boli, J. and G.M Thomas. (1997). “World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International NonGovernmental Organization.” American Sociological Review 62: 171-190 ³¹⁶
Callamard, A. (2020). Challenges to, and Manifesto for, Fact-Finding in a Time of Disinformation. Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law, 10 (2), 128. ³¹⁷
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. International organization, 887-917. ³¹⁸
Finnemore, M. (1996). Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from sociology’s institutionalism. ³¹⁹
Mahdavi, M. (2017). Iran: Multiple Sources of a Grassroots Social Democracy?. In Iran’s Struggles for Social Justice (pp. 271-288). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. ³²⁰
Mayer, A. (2000). The Universality of Human Rights: Lessons from the Islamic Republic. Social Research, 67 (2), 519-536. Retrieved September 12, 2020, from [suspicious link removed] ³²¹
Matin-Asgari, A. (2017). The Left’s Contribution to Social Justice in Iran: A Brief Historical Overview. In Iran’s Struggles for Social Justice (pp. 255-269). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. ³²²
Redfield, Peter. (2008). “Vital mobility and the humanitarian kit.” In Andrew Lakoff and
Vahabzadeh, P. (Ed.). (2016). Iran’s Struggles for Social Justice: Economics, Agency, Justice, Activism. Springer. ³²³
Zimmt, R. (2020). INSS Insight No. 1228, November 18, 2019 The Gasoline Protests in Iran: Initial Assessments and Implications. ³²⁴
Foucault, M. (1975). Discipline and Punish. Resling Publishing, 2015. ³²⁵

Appendices ³²⁶

[Image: Fuel pump connected to nooses] ³²⁷

[Image: Man giving thumbs up]

Figure 1: Photo of political prisoner Amir Hossein Moradi. Source: HRA-news agency 328

Figure 2: Amir Hossein Moradi, Saeed Tamjidi, and Mohammad Rajabi – 3 protesters sentenced to death. ³²⁹

[Image: Man in blue plaid shirt]

Figure 3: Source: Taheri movement www.twitter.com/taheri_movement – Twitter storm for imprisoned scientist Ahmadreza Djalali. ³³⁰

[Image: Statistics on execution with Khamenei in background]

Figure 4: Statistical data on executions in Iran against the background of Khamenei’s picture. Source: Anonymous Twitter user. 331

[Image: Five men’s faces]

Figure 5: Names and faces of 5 prisoners sentenced to death in the Islamic Republic of Iran for political charges. Source: Twitter user. 332

[Image: “Stop the use of forced confessions”]

Figure 6: FIDH organization on Twitter – Stop the use of forced confessions. ³³³

[Image: Noose with text “Who is next?”]

Figure 7: Who is next? Anonymous Twitter user – Part of the campaign against executions in Iran. 334

[Image: Man with wings and dove]

Figure 8: Photo of Iranian wrestling champion Navid Afkari who was executed in September. ³³⁵

[Image: Man with mustache]

Figure 9: Against the execution of Haydar Ghorbani, a political prisoner of Kurdish origin. ³³⁶

[Image: Sketch of woman in headscarf]

Figure 10: From Amnesty campaign for the release of political prisoner Nasrin Sotoudeh. ³³⁷

Further Reading on Political Prisoners and Executions in the Islamic Republic of Iran ³³⁸

The last interview with Bahman Shojaei – Leafy sees (wordpress.com) ³³⁹
Three young men sentenced to death in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Mohammad Rajabi, Saeed Tamjidi ³⁴⁰
34 political prisoners on death row in the Islamic Republic of #Iran – Leafy sees (wordpress.com) ³⁴¹
No to executions in the Islamic Republic of #Iran #اعدم_نكنيد – Leafy sees (wordpress.com) ³⁴²
Atena Daemi – Political Prisoner ³⁴³
Ahmadreza Djalali ³⁴⁴
Ali Younesi ³⁴⁵
Niloufar Bayani ³⁴⁶
Nasrin Sotoudeh ³⁴⁷
Haydar Ghorbani ³⁴⁸