Reflecting on my experiences, I recall a pivotal moment in 2018 when the concept of “semantic terrorism” emerged in my mind. It was the same year that I had a psychotic breakdown, leading to my involuntary commitment in a psychiatric ward for five days. I do not mean to imply that Trump’s presidency caused me to develop mental health issues. Of course, I had some personal challenges to contend with as well. I was dealing with a slap lawsuit from my abuser, going through a divorce, and struggling with substance abuse, particularly marijuana. Following my breakdown, I received the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder and was heavily medicated.
The Trump Administration’s actions and rhetoric during this time contributed to widespread fear and anxiety among many, myself included. The prevalence of misinformation, conspiracy theories, and “fake news” exacerbated these feelings and created a sense of uncertainty and distrust in the political landscape.
“Here’s why Trump’s ‘fake news’ tactic is especially effective” by Naomi Schalit, Published on Al Jazeera, January 17, 2018. [https://aje.io/poonxs]
“A new study suggests ‘fake news’ might have won Donald Trump the 2016 election” by Philip Bump, Published on The Washington Post, April 3, 2018. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/04/03/a-new-study-suggests-fake-news-might-have-won-donald-trump-the-2016-election/]
“Trump promotes Epstein conspiracy theory, the latest in a pattern of baseless claims spread by president” by Daniel Dale, Published on CNN Politics, August 12, 2019. [https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/12/politics/trump-conspiracy-theories-jeffrey-epstein/index.html]
“The Paranoid Style and the Rise of Fake News in American Politics” by Matthew Luttig, Published on APSA Preprints, September 22, 2019. [https://preprints.apsanet.org/engage/api-gateway/apsa/assets/orp/resource/item/5d87daa9f895ab0012b96232/original/the-paranoid-style-and-the-rise-of-fake-news-in-american-politics.pdf]
“People with schizoaffective disorder might often suffer from paranoid delusions, perceiving conspiracies everywhere. As noted in a WebMD article titled ‘What Is Paranoid Schizophrenia?’ by Terri D’Arrigo, dated February 21, 2024, paranoid delusions are fixed beliefs that appear real despite contrary evidence, often accompanied by profound fear and a blurred sense of reality.
It might be tempting to dismiss my thoughts on semantic terrorism as a manifestation of paranoid delusion. However, based on my personal lived experience and diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, I argue otherwise. Just because I experienced paranoid delusions doesn’t mean I lacked insight into the political reality around me or that the concept of semantic terrorism should be easily dismissed as the ramblings of a madwoman.”
“While the term ‘semantic terrorism’ may sound somewhat paranoid, looking back on it now, five years later, I believe that this concept could still hold validity and relevance given the ongoing state of world affairs. Furthermore, it is grounded in theoretical literature as well as recent publications in world news.”
The research reveals that the foreign intervention factors in the Israeli discourse on social networks, in cases examined in the framework of the research, are not siding with any particular group in Israeli society or with any particular agenda, and their main purpose is to deepen divisions in Israeli society in order to weaken it.
In a document published by Meta, the company that owns Facebook, discussing influence operations that took place in the years 2017-2020, they defined influence operations as “coordinated efforts to manipulate or disrupt public discourse for strategic purposes.”
The Iranian influence campaign included disseminating content, often copied from authentic sources, which featured hate speech, attempts to evoke emotions, and the use of established hashtags like #Enough_Is_Enough and #Hot_News.
The authors delineate the modus operandi of the entities conducting intervention operations. These patterns can aid in identifying future interventions and underscore characteristics requiring deeper examination. However, it’s crucial to acknowledge the learning and adaptation process among intervention operators over time, leading to the evolution of certain traits. One significant change in the past year impacting influence operations is the heightened accessibility and availability of Generative AI technologies.
Engagement with controversial topics in Israeli society: The diversity of topics addressed by various networks indicates their lack of interest in aligning with specific entities in the political system or in Israeli society or acting against them. Rather, their aim is to identify issues that can deepen divisions in Israeli society and those that elicit strong reactions on social networks.
According to the content and nature of the intervention activities, it seems that the goal of the operators is to increase internal strife in Israel. Therefore, they choose to engage in contentious issues and sometimes amplify and sharpen messages (for example, by comparing Israeli leaders to Hitler and introducing anti-Semitic messages).
Focusing on contentious issues – adapting and changing content to topics that are contentious at any given time: the investigated networks address a wide range of issues that are at the heart of Israeli public discourse. It seems that the operators of the intervention operations have intimate familiarity with current events in Israel, and tailor the content and topics of each operation to issues they identify as potentially contentious. Among the topics addressed by the networks: for/against government officials’ appointments, elections in Israel, etc. The shared content on the networks also reflects awareness of current Israeli events – cost of living, COVID-19, etc.
A minority of responses alongside Israeli public awareness: Despite the considerable resources invested in implementing most of the intervention operations investigated, it appears that the majority failed to generate significant acknowledgment and elicit responses from Israeli users. However, two types of responses are noteworthy, and their implications should be considered: First, Israeli users have become aware of the presence of malicious influencers on social networks and react accordingly. Indeed, over the years of the research, awareness of this phenomenon has increased, partly due to coverage in leading media outlets in Israel and worldwide. Awareness that foreign actors are involved in what appears to be internal discourse may create feelings of insecurity, mistrust, and infiltration. However, these issues may not have gained significant acknowledgment among the Israeli public because they are intertwined with internal hatred discourse, making it challenging to distinguish between foreign intervention (masquerading as internal discourse) and authentic internal discourse.
“Analogous research in the digital world”: One of the main challenges in conducting the research was that most of it relied on analyzing data collected by FakeReporter and mostly preserved in static screenshots of accounts and content. Much of the content had already been removed from the network during the research. This made it difficult to add an analytical and statistical dimension to the analysis, perform semantic analyses, and identify patterns across different networks, limiting the insights that could be drawn under the existing conditions. Additionally, due to the data collection method, the coverage of the networks was partial and did not include all the content published on some of the networks, but rather random screenshots of some of the published content.
The media exposure of foreign intervention operations on social networks in Israel could serve as a tool to enhance digital literacy among the general public and increase suspicion towards fictitious or suspicious accounts. There is significant value in improving the public’s ability to identify and deal with foreign interference in social networks. However, this exposure may also provide operators of these networks with an incentive to continue their activities, as they may perceive that they are successful in influencing the Israeli public and generating reasonable acknowledgment. Such exposure may also prompt these operators to conceal their activities and operate more clandestinely, making it difficult for detection and confrontation efforts. Additionally, this exposure may serve as a tool for political manipulation and increasing division within Israeli society, aiming to deepen the rift and alienation among the country’s citizens.
It’s crucial to recognize that individuals with conditions like schizoaffective disorder may be especially prone to interpreting external stimuli in a manner that aligns with their delusions or paranoid beliefs. The current political climate in Israel, marked by heightened tensions and polarization, could worsen these vulnerabilities and potentially trigger psychotic episodes in susceptible individuals.
Moreover, the notion of “semantic terrorism” highlights how foreign influence operations can manipulate information and discourse in ways that are particularly distressing or destabilizing for individuals with mental health conditions. These operations may exploit existing vulnerabilities and contribute to feelings of paranoia or confusion, further impacting the well-being of those affected.
Acknowledging and addressing these intersections between mental health and external influences is vital for providing support and intervention to vulnerable individuals. It underscores the importance of comprehending the complexities of mental illness while also taking into account broader societal and political factors that can impact vulnerable populations.
Leafy sees 
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